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UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS AND
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: DILUTED
PROMISES, FORESEEABLE FUTURES
Frank C. Newman*

Regarding Civil and Political Rights, '[t]he Covenant . . . codifies the essential freedoms people must enjoy in a democratic society, such as the right
to vote, freedom of peaceful assembly, equal protection of the law, the rights
to liberty and security, and freedom of opinion and expression,' wrote President Bush on August 8, 1991 to Clairborne Pell of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.'

These topics are here considered: (1) What About the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights?; 2 (2) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' and the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; (3) The Civil and Political Covenant and Administrative Law;
(4) The Covenant's "Human Rights Committee," Nuremberg Law,
and Weapons of Mass Destruction; and (5) The Covenant's Impact
on U.N. Peacekeeping.
* Jackson H. Ralston Professor of International Law (emeritus), University of California,

Berkeley; and California Supreme Court Justice (retired).
1. Letter from President George Bush to Hon. Clairborne Pell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (August 8, 1991), SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
25 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 660 (1992). The American Bar Association Journal re-

ported that "[t]he Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which requires ratifying countries to provide and protect civil and
political rights patterned after the United States Bill of Rights." Good Deeds, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1992, at 130.
That last clause is myopic, even more than the Bush excerpt quoted above. United States lawyers soon will learn that the Covenant's scope greatly extends the U.S. Bill of Rights.
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) [hereinafter
ICESCRI.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
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WHAT ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS?

President Jimmy Carter in a 1978 letter to the Senate noted that
"[tihe two human rights Covenants are based upon the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in whose conception, formulation and
adoption the United States played a central role." 4 Like U.N. personnel, and also like the Honorable Warren Christopher (whose
State Department letter recommended that both Covenants be ratified), Carter accorded No. 1 status to the Economic, Social, and
Cultural Covenant. 5 The Civil and Political Covenant was expected
to be No. 2.6
That No. 1 primacy for the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant still reflects U.N. views, which also are those of most other
governments. But during the Reagan and Bush years our government continued to espouse, with vigor, a view that the economic,
social, and cultural rights articulated do not merit U.S. endorse-

ment.7 No one knows yet what the impact of these pertinent words
in the now-ratified Civil and Political Covenant may be:
[I]n accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal
of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from
fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social
and cultural rights .... 8

It seems unlikely, I am sad to say, that U.S. ratification of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant will occur soon.9
4. Message from the President Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, 14
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978) [hereinafter Message from the President].
5. Id.
6. Id.

7. Nearly five years prior to the U.N. adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Franklin D. Roosevelt in his State of the Union Message on Jan. II, 1944, had this to say to
Congress:
As our nation has grown in size and stature ... political rights proved inadequate to
assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness.... [T]rue individual freedom cannot
exist without economic security and independence. 'Necessitous men are not free
men.' People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are
made. . . . In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident.
We have accepted, so to speak, a second bill of rights ....
8. ICCPR, supra note 3, pmbl, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173 (emphasis added).
9. Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights
Law: Toward an 'Entirely New Strategy,' 44 HAST. L.J. 79 (1992). "Covenant" is a word rarely
used. I doubt, however, that any confusion resulted when "Bill Clinton called for 'anew covenant'
to heal the nation as he accepted the Democratic nomination .... See S.F. CHRON., July 19,
1992, at 1.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

The president and his secretary of state are the CEOs of U.S.
human rights policy. Congress nonetheless - with no ifs, ands, or
buts - has prescribed that the Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs has overall policy responsibility for the creation of United States Government human rights
policy."
That awesome responsibility is distinct and separate from the Assistant Secretary's additional duties to "maintain continuous observation and review of all matters pertaining to human rights . . . in
the conduct of foreign policy" - including:
(1) "gathering detailed information" regarding other nations'
governments;
(2) preparing the annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices;
(3) making recommendations and advising as to certain A.I.D.
projects; and
(4) "performing other responsibilities which serve to promote increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by
all countries."' 1
That fourth item, inter alia, commands "continuous observation and
review of all matters pertaining to" the performance of the United
States as a leading member of the United Nations and of other international organizations. 2 Yet it is not clear that the Assistant
Secretary from now on (awkwardly, with probable embarrassment)
must distinguish nearly all other countries' duties under the Civil
and Political Covenant from the notably less demanding duties that
now govern U.S. officials, which as we must concede are less demanding because of the numerous U.S. reservations, declarations,
understandings, and a proviso.
Further, in various international forums where nations are criticized for consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations
of internationally recognized human rights, must U.S. representa10. 22 U.S.C. § 2384(f)(2)(C) (1988) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2384(0(1) ("The Secretary of State shall carry out his responsibility under section 2304 of this title [i.e., human rights
and security assistance] through the Assistant Secretary.").
11. Id. § 2384(0(2) (emphasis added).
12. Id.
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tives (in presumed good conscience) now say: "Your government is
bound by certain clauses of the Covenant even though we in the
United States chose not to be bound. Therefore an appropriate investigation of your allegedly illegal practices is of course warranted,
even though the United States itself would enjoy immunity from
such an investigation?"
III.

THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW' 3

According to our Constitution's Article II, section 3, one of President Clinton's essential chores is to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed ..... "I The mandate includes not only statutes
but also treaties; and the Civil and Political Covenant is now, at
last, a U.S. treaty.
The Constitution also commands in Article VI, with respect to
treaties like the Covenant, that "[j]udges in every State shall be
bound."' 5 A U.S. declaration, however, now proclaims that "[t]he
13. Administrative law is perhaps the overall subject most consistently ignored by human rights
scholars (and also by American Society of International Law leaders). I predict, for instance, that
careful monitoring would disclose State Department violations of several commands of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act - e.g., these words of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1988):
Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for
the guidance of the public (A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established
places at which, the employees . . . from whom, and the methods whereby,
the public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or obtain
decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available; ....
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law,
and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
Note, too, that Article 14(l) of the Covenant prescribes for certain procedures that "everyone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal."
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176, cf Frank C. Newman, Natural Justice,
Due Process, and the New InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: Prospectus, 1967
PUBLIC L. 274, 304 ("Mrs. Roosevelt and Suit at Law"); see also 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) ("[S]o far as
the orderly conduct of public business permits, an interested person may appear before an agency
or its responsible employees for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a proceeding, whether interlocutory, summary, or otherwise, or in connection with an agency function."); cf FRANK C. NEWMAN & STANLEY S. SURREY ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 213 n.6 (1955).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § .3.
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not selfexecuting."'" That phrase is thought by many observers to mean
that judges - federal and state - must patiently await the enact-

ment of congressional statutes that make the Covenant effective in
courts. 7
So far as I can discover, no authoritative discussions are available
that focus on this question: Must U.S. executive and administrative
officials whose work is affected by treatiesfollow the "non-self-executing" rules designed for judges?
Suppose, for instance, that an alien lawfully within U.S. territory
is restricted regarding the "freedom to choose his residence" prescribed by the Covenant's Article 12.1.18 Suppose also that the restriction affecting him (1) is not "provided by law" or not "necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public

health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others,"'19 or (2) is
not consistent with the right accorded by Article 10(1) to be
"treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the

human person." 2
Should a Department of Justice lawyer or other cognizant official
nonetheless rule that, since Congress has not yet acted via statute,
Articles 12 and 10(1) of the Covenant are not applicable? I find no
authority for such a result. The Bush Administration in its explanation of proposed reservations, understandings, and declarations had
this to say:
For reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that the
16. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1,at 19; reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657.
17. Since the Second Circuit opinion in Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980),
many of us have been enlightened by Stefan Riesenfeld's The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties
and U.S. v. Postal: Win At Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980). Even more enlightening, I
think, is his recent review of certain sections of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. See Stefan Riesenfeld, InternationalAgreements, 14 YALE. J. INT'L L.
455 (1989). After reviewing three centuries of history, he states:
The President and Congress may have to decide initially whether to call for or enact
implementing legislation. But their ultimate interpretation of the international agreement rests with the courts. . . . [Tlhere are instances where the Department of
State's views were rejected both by the courts and Congress. . . . [Dlespite the views
expressed in the Restatement, it is questionable whether the Senate can bind the
courts by appending an understanding to its resolution of advice and consent.
Id. at 466. See, too, his and Frederick Abbott's Forward:Symposium on ParliamentaryParticipation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 293, 295 (1991) ("Decla-

rations regarding self-execution").
18. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 12(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
19. See id. art. 12(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
20. Id. art. 10(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
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substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing. The intent is
to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S.
courts. As was the case with the Torture Convention, existing U.S. law generally complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not
contemplated."

Also, responding to Senator Moynihan's questions regarding U.S.
labor laws that affect Article 22 ("freedom of association, the right
to organize, and collective bargaining"), the Bush Administration
stated:
As a non-self-executing treaty, Article 22 of the Covenant would not, if ratified, become directly enforceable as United States law in U.S. courts. As the
preceding discussion has made clear, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution already brings the United States into compliance with the Covenant. No additional implementing legislation is required."

That last sentence is revealing. Unless some other U.S. declaration (or reservation, understanding, or proviso) applies, the implication seems to be that, of course, the Covenant's commands are to be
promoted and respected by U.S. officials acting otherwise than "in
U.S. courts." Specifically and illustratively, if (via either rule-making or adjudication) federal or state officials jeopardize the right
prescribed in Article 22 to "freedom of association with others," an
individual or group may appeal administratively, via whatever channels are available, and also claim "Violation!" while seeking, say,
recourse via members of Congress or a state legislature. Those channels differ often and significantly from recourse to courts.
Consider too this excerpt from the Covenant's Article 2(3):
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
21. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 19, reprinted in 31 1.L.M. at 657
(emphasis added). Clearly the final sentence of that somewhat baffling excerpt refers to the Covenant as well as the Torture Convention. Cf 137 CONG. REC. S5728, 5731 (daily ed. May 14,
1991) (regarding U.S. understandings re the Abolition of Forced Labor treaty and stating that
certain ILO "conclusions and practice . . . have no force and effect on courts in the United
States" - nor does the treaty "limit the contempt powers of courts" (emphasis added)).
22. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. supra note 1, at 27, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 661
(emphasis added).
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3

Except for "judicial" (and other words arguably affected by specific
U.S. reservations or declarations, understandings, or proviso),
should not Article 2(3)'s powerful assurances about "administrative
or legislative authorities or . . . any other competent authority"
benefit every U.S. person?
A.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights and HumanitarianAffairs

Administrative law deals with rule-making as well as adjudicating, and many State Department rules concern human rights. Detailed instructions govern embassies, for example, and other units
that help prepare February Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices. And the assistant secretary is "responsible" not only for
that annual document but also, pursuant to 22 U.S.C.
§ 2384(f)(2)(C), "for the creation [sometimes via rule-making] of
'
United States Government human rights policy." 24
Our focus here is partly on the content of that created policy but
also on the indisputable power of the State Department to promulgate interpretive rules. 5 The question is whether, to help ensure our
government's compliance with its innumerable duties under the
Covenant, the assistant secretary should now draft and then, if appropriate, seek approval of interpretations that on major issues are
designed to instruct countless officials in nearly all federal departments (e.g., Pentagon, Commerce, Energy, Interior, Justice, Labor)
and also independent agencies such as the Federal Communications
Commission. Most personnel affected, I predict, will never have
heard about possible applicability of the Covenant to their work;
and - to whet more than those officials' mere curiosity - formal
rules could be instructive.
Consider illustratively the Covenant's Article 17, which reads: "1.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
23. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
24. 22 U.S.C. § 2384(f)(2)(c) (1988).
25. See, e.g., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990, at 1624 ("United States
diplomatic missions are given guidance in September for submission of draft reports"); cf. last
sentence of first paragraph on p. 1627 ("additional guidelines" for compliance with Generalized
System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984).
See generally CFR INDEX AND FINDING AIDS 711-14 (Office of the Federal Register National
Archives and Records Administration, Revised as of Jan. 1, 1992) (providing the listings under
"State Department").
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his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks
on his honour or reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."26
"[Pirotection of the law," in that last sentence, sometimes does
include reasonable assurance of a judicial remedy. 27 More importantly, the phrase appears to call for an overall review of statutes
and rules guiding most federal departments and agencies that now,
expressly or impliedly, do command or permit interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence. The Covenant mandates that
"arbitrary . . . interference" must be proscribed; many existing

statutes and rules are inadequate to help promote that effect, and
Article 17(2) clearly is aimed in part at needed enactment or promulgation of new statutes and rules.
By way of illustration: Administrators of the immense body of
federal law that involves procurement say, or varying federal-licensing functions, indeed will need State Department guidance for a
Covenant-required examination of existing practices regarding "privacy, family, home or correspondence."
B.

Attorneys' Duties

Not many practicing lawyers have, to date, learned much about
detailed requirements of the Covenant. Illustratively, contemplate
again Article 17(1), which states that "no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation. 28
In U.S. law schools the first-year torts course traditionally introduces laws that govern "unlawful attacks on . . . honour and
reputation." But what about "arbitrary . . .interference with . . .

family, home or correspondence?" Is that now sufficiently protected
by existing law - federal, state, local? I believe not. Similarly, the
"privacy" now required to be protected by executive, administrative,
and legislative officials covers a much broader range of interests
than do traditional tort laws and Roe v. Wade progeny. 29
26. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177-78.
27. Does "non-self-executing" conceivably mean that judges reviewing administrative action
may reject arguments involving interpretation of the Covenant? I hope not!
28. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 17(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
29. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 129-30 (1980) (citing Article 12 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
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Other words of comparable reach that lawyers will have to address appear in Article 18 ("freedom of thought, conscience and religion"), Article 19(2) ("freedom to . . receive . . . information"),
and Article 24 ("[elvery child shall have . . . the right to such mea-

sures of protection as are required by his status as a minor"). Malpractice charges against lawyers who find it hard to believe that
laws possibly inapplicable to judges nonetheless are applicable to
administrators and legislators might well become more than mere
brooding omnipresences.
IV.

THE COVENANT'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, NUREMBERG
LAW, AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Article 6.1 of the Covenant prescribes that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life,' 30 and derogations from Article 6 are (by
Article 4.1) forbidden - even "[i]n time of public emergency.""1
Those words are not mentioned in the U.S. ratification documents,
and the only implied reference is in the U.S. reservation affecting
the death penalty. 2
What might President Clinton's representatives say, I wonder, if
(at a session set for critique of the U.S. initial report to the United
Nations under Article 40), a member of the Covenant's Human
Rights Committee were to ask: "Concerning Article 6.1, what steps
have been taken by the White House or other bodies with respect to
deprivation of life and your stockpiles of nuclear weapons?"
The immediate reaction of U.S. spokespeople would, I believe, be
the silent thought, "Why is that any of your damn business?" Yet
nearly a decade ago, in General Comment No. 14, which supplemented an earlier comment on Article 6, the Committee's final two
paragraphs prescribed as follows:
6. The production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against humanity.
7. The Committee accordingly, in the interest of mankind, calls upon all
States, whether Parties to the Covenant or not, to take urgent steps, unilaterally and by agreement, to rid the world of this menace.

Countless people whose rights the Covenant was designed to protect, throughout the world, know a little bit about crimes of aggres30. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 6(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
31. Id. art. 4(l), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
32. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 31 I.L.M at 651.
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sion, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Indisputably those
crimes (and threats thereof) can grossly violate internationally recognized human rights. Exactly which rights? To answer that question (having roots in Nuremberg), most pundits turn initially to laws
administered by the International Committee of the Red Cross,
which shares with governments a jurisdiction over war crimes. Similarly, U.N. Security Council rulings (e.g., as to Iraq and Serbia) are
generally treated as authoritative as to crimes of aggression. No
such references, however, seem to guide various experts who seek
authentic pronouncements on Nuremberg's proscription No. 3,
crimes against humanity.3"
My view is that for the clearly most authoritative guidance we
should turn to Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (crafted in 1946
to augment the now more famous Charter of the International Military Tribunal), which for decades has been international customary
law. 4 These are the definitions:
33. Cf N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 17, 1992, at Al ("We know that crimes against humanity have occurred, and we know when and where they occurred") (quoting Secretary of State Lawrence S.
Eagleburger speaking to delegates at a conference on the fighting in the Balkans). He added, "We
know, moreover, which forces committed those crimes, and under whose command they operated.
And we know, finally, who the political leaders are and to whom those military commanders were
- and still are - responsible." Id. (emphasis added); cf id. at A10 ("The United States has
already submitted four war-crimes reports to the United Nations that detail specific episodes of
Serbian brutality, and Mr. Eagleburger described nine incidents of Serbian 'crimes against humanity,' including murders of men, women and children, mass executions, torture and the forced
expulsion of civilians from their villages.").
34. "The Civil and Political Covenant ... refers to criminal offenses that exist 'under national
or international law' and deals with 'any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations' [Article 15]. The laws of the [Nuremberg] International Military Tribunal, as refined by
Allied Control Council Law No. 10, do indeed exemplify those 'general principles of law.' " Frank
C. Newman, The U.S. Bill of Rights, International Bill of Human Rights, and Other 'Bills,' 40
EMORY L.J. 731, 741 (1991).
For intriguing mini-memoirs, see Telford Taylor's THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS:
A PERSONAL MEMOIR 275 (1992):
Fahy's office in Berlin was working on . . .Control Council Law No. 10, signed on
December 20, 1946, by the members of the Council: General McNarney, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, General Louis Koeltz for the absent General Pierre Koenig, and Marshal Georgi Zhukov.
The preamble to Law No. 10 declared that its purpose was 'to give effect to the
terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement of 8
August 1945, and the Charter [of the International Military Tribunal] issued pursuant thereto.' Law No. 10 accomplished little by way of zonal uniformity on war
crimes. The British pioceeded under the Royal Warrant guidelines, and made no provision forcrimes against peace. The French were chiefly interested in German crimes
in France against Frenchmen and generally relied on French law rather than international law, even in war crimes cases. As for the Russians, only occasional scraps of
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(a) Crimes against Peace: Planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements,
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(b) War Crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and offenses, including but not
limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds ....

Are the wrongdoings those definitions proscribe the concern of
"criminal" law only? Of course not. Because of the definitions, uncountable thousands of Nazis and other WWII violators suffered
civil penalties, rather than - and/or in addition to - "criminal"
punishment. Moreover, uncounted millions of victims obtained restitution, rehabilitation, reparations, etc., which were based on the definitions but were prescribed pursuant to traditions of civil, rather
than criminal, law. 35 As years pass, respect for the Civil and Political Covenant will of course require parallel responses, even as to
crimes committed during armed conflict.
V.

THE COVENANT'S IMPACT ON

U.N.

PEACEKEEPING

"Blue helmets"; U.N. missions; U.S.-led forces; "sovereignty";
"Allied Jets Bomb [Iraqi] Missile Sites"; etc.? In recent months,
mainline-media have not often focused, for instance, on threats of
war crimes information emerged from behind the Iron Curtain. . . . In the American
Zone, however, Control Council Law No. 10, together with the amended Executive
Order, laid the legal and administrative basis for the war crimes cases at Nuremberg
which were to follow the pending trial before the International Military Tribunal.
Id.
35. Frank C. Newman, Redress for Gulf War Violations of Human Rights, 20 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 213, 215 (1992) ("A powerful fact is that the . . . Nuremberg trials enlightened us
regarding not only criminal law, but also civil law.")); cf. David D. Caron, Introductory Note to
U.N. Compensation Commission Report Ire Iraqi With Decisions of the Governing Council
(1992) 31 I.L.M. 1009-17 (1992); see also SEMINAR ON THE RIGHT TO RESTITUTION. COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDA-

(Theo van Boven et al. eds., 1992). Also, note the 1986 decision of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. USA, 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27), voting 12 to 3 that "the
United States of America is under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua
for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under customary international
law enumerated above.
... Id.
MENTAL FREEDOMS
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armed conflict in Cyprus, Namibia, Salvador, Guatemala, or Northern Ireland. But U.N. personnel and "Whose troops?" certainly
have been newsworthy as to peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, Somalia,
Angola, Cambodia, and other frightening arenas.
The U.N. Charter in Article 1 proclaims a primary purpose
[t]o maintain 'international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace . . . and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and internationallaw, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace.36

Now, after nearly a half-century of varied U.N. activities, the
substantive rules of the Civil and Political Covenant indeed do proclaim "principles of . . . international law." And U.N. peacekeeping may be governed' too by the "principles of justice". that the U.N.
Charter's Article I acknowledges. Consider, for instance, these comments of the International Tribunal in its 1946 "Judgment of the
Niirnberg Trial":
In interpreting the words of the Pact, it must be remembered that international law is not the product of an international legislature, and that such
international agreements as the Pact of Paris have to deal with general principles of law, and not with administrative matters of procedure. The law of
war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of
states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general
principles ofjustice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. This
law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a changing
world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express and define for
more accurate reference the principles of law already existing.3' 7

The Tribunal added: "Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured
and murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established rules of
international law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity. Civilian populations in occupied territories suf8
fered the same fate."
Consider, too, Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter: "All members
shall settle their international disputes in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." 3 9
So, when they act pursuant to Security Council decisions based
36.
37.
38.
39.

U.N. CHARTER art. I (emphasis added).
Judgment of the Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 109 (1946) (emphasis added).
Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
U.N CHARTER art. 2.3 (emphasis added).
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on Chapter VII of the Charter, are not Blue Helmets and other
U.N. personnel clearly governed by clauses of the International Bill
of Human Rights, including of course the Civil and Political
Covenant?
A.

Do Clauses of the Covenant Apply to U.S. Military and
Civilian Officials in Yugoslavia and Somalia?

The answer to that question is yes. The command of the Covenant's nonderogable Article 6 is that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life"; that is, no one. It should be irrelevant whether
individuals are within U.S. territory and subject to U.S. jurisdiction.4 ° Article 7, also nonderogable, is limited by the first U.S. reservation: "The United States considers itself bound . . . to the extent
that 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means
the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
.. "'41Nonderogable Article 16, however, significantly requires
that "[e]veryone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law."' 2 And, under nonderogable Article 18, all
permissible limitations on "[f]reedom to manifest one's religion or
beliefs [must be] prescribed by law" even when they are claimed to
be "necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4 3
The Articles 9 and 10 rights to liberty and security of person
(e.g., to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person) are derogable, under Article 4, (1)
40. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 6(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. 1 have not completed an historical
search of these words in the Covenant's Article 2(l): "to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status." Id. art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173; cf DOMINIC
McGOLDRICK. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTER-

270 (1991).
Textual analysis of the Preamble and other words of the Covenant (through Article 50) persuades me that the drafters of Article 2(l) crafted what may be the world's most complete and
exact nondiscrimination clause. I wish, for instance, it had been considered as a possible model for
an Ethics Committee proposal in February 1993 that Canon 2C of the California Code of Judicial
Conduct be amended by striking the italicized words in these sentences: "A judge shall not hold
membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin. This Canon does not apply to membership in a religious organization."
41. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note I, at 12, reprinted in 31 I.L.M at 654.
42. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 16, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 (emphasis added).
43. Id. art. 18(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
NATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
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only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" and (2) only when measures taken "are not inconsistent with
. . . other obligations under international law and do not involve

discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language,
religion or social origin.""' An illustrative question is: In any situation could U.S. personnel legally deny "the right to the protection of
the law" (which Article 17 mandates) against rape?"' Also, how
about the assurance of Article 27 concerning "ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities?" Are its guarantees inapplicable whenever an
armed conflict interferes? I think not.46
B "Peacekeeping" Generally

I suggest that all officials who direct Blue Helmet troops and
other U.N. personnel are governed by the International Bill of
Human Rights (and, thus, clauses of the Civil and Political Covenant). Yet the most appropriate routes for channeling those "nonstate actors" are perhaps via the paths of customary international
law.4 7 Slippery slopes, however, lie awaiting; accordingly, I limit remarks here to treaty obligations. Their scope under the Civil and
Political Covenant can be fortified too by its general clauses like
these:
44. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. I do not address here, e.g., (1) the
phrase "life of the nation" in Article 4; (2) Article 12(4), which states that "[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country"; (3) Article 24's protections of children;
or (4) the second sentence of U.S. Understanding No. 11(1), using the phrase "distinction that
may have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status."
45. Cf. Robin Morgan, Isolation Incidents, Ms., Mar./Apr. 1993, at I ("Last year, when the
U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) received protests about the troops' behavior,
UNTAC chief Yashushi Akashi replied that '18-year-old, hot-blooded soldiers' have a right to
drink and chase 'young, beautiful beings of the opposite sex.' Rape in a way has always been a
weapon - one that should be as expressly forbidden in international law as chemical weapons and
germ warfare.").
That Akashi quote may be accurate; and explicit reference to rape ought to be made generally,
not only in Allied Control Council Law No. 10. My contentions, however, are: (1) that the Covenant's Article 7 is explicit enough ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment.") and (2) that, regardless of the U.S. reservations as to Article 7, U.S.
personnel are covered by Article 17. Query: Does that reservation affect the second sentence of
Article 7? Cf. Elliot J. Schuchardt, Walking a Thin Line: Distinguishing Between Research and
Medical Practice During Operation Desert Storm, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 77 (1992).
46. For recent commentary, see Marc F. Plattner, The Protection of Displaced Persons in
Non-international Armed Conflicts, Int. Rev. of Red Cross No. 291, 567, 569 (1992) ("[I]n situations of armed conflict international human rights law and international humanitarian law are
applied concurrently."); cf. Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationships of the Laws, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 935, 939 (1982).
47. See Newman, supra note 23, at 738.

19931

U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS

1255

1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
present Covenant.
2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the
pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it
recognizes them to a lesser extent.'
[T]he individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.' 9

CONCLUSION

Mostly in these pages I have explored topics that appear to have
received meager attention on hundreds of thousands of pages that,
since 1966, have dealt with the U.S. and the U.N. Covenants. My
hunch is that authors (and drafters) during our next quarter-century will deal with a Covenant's jurisprudence destined to become
almost overwhelming - in the same way that a gargantuan literature on civil liberties and civil rights law too often tends to confound
us in the United States.
It seems predictable that international activities of "United Nations people" - as well as other international organization people
- will guide uses of the International Bill of Human Rights dramatically, much more dramatically than mere foreign and "comparative" developments (including, e.g., the old "law of nations" recognized by our First Congress 50 ) have nurtured phantasmagoric,
troubling "solutions" of innumerable problems addressed by U.S.
Bill of Rights clauses - federal and state.
Demonstrably, the international repute of our government has
been diminished by (1) truly too many delays in ratifying and (2)
administrations' persistence as to vague and erratic reservations,
declarations, and understandings. Might good faith compliance with
the Civil and Political Covenant (here and abroad), supplemented
by honest efforts "to take joint and separate action in cooperation
48. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 5, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
49. Id. pmbl para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
50. See Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 880.(2d Cir. 1980) (citing the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
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with the [U.N.] for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55,"51 enhance immensely these words in a congressional
command now seventeen years in effect?
The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as
set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States
shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized
human rights by all countries."2

The two final words country, too.

51. U.N.

CHARTER

"all countries" -

art. 56.

52. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).

indeed do include our

